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Abstract
Prior studies have shown that selfish behavior is reduced when co–players have the oppor-
tunity to approve/disapprove a player’s choice, even if that has no consequences on the
player’s material payoff. Using a prisoner’s dilemma, we experimentally study the causes
of this phenomenon, which seems crucial to understand compliance with social norms.
Our data is consistent with a model based on the assumption that people feel badly if
they expect to be disapproved by others. Furthermore, we find suggestive evidence in line
with the following assumptions: (i) People become more aware about the others opinion
if feedback is available, and (ii) even if the feedback is ex post and has no effect on their
ex ante expectations about disapproval, people prefer not to receive negative feedback.
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“Compared with the contempt of mankind, all other evils are easily supported”
(from: The theory of moral sentiments, by Adam Smith)
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This paper uses theory and experiments to study why non–material rewards and sanctions
affect behavior. We term rewards/sanctions to be non–material if they do not alter the
material welfare of the rewarded/sanctioned agent, but affect her emotional state. Frequently
conveyed by means of verbal or facial expressions, they transmit our approval/disapproval of
the others’ behavior or personal qualities (for this reason, we will often refer to them simply as
feedback). Thus, examples of non–material sanctions include social disapproval, humiliation,
insults, peer pressure, public embarrassment, and social ostracism.1
Exploring why such feedback affects behavior is interesting for several reasons. First,
compliance with social norms, which is decisive for the functioning of societies (Homans
1961, Arrow 1974, Elster 1989, and Fehr and Fischbacher 2004), seems to be promoted when
people can receive feedback. This has been stressed, among others, by social scientists like
Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons. Second, non–material rewards and sanctions have two
appealing features: They are often less costly to apply than their material counterparts and
their use is apparently less constrained by social norms. The use of material sanctions by
private parties, in constrast, is often regarded as morally reprehensible –e.g., many people
believe that parents should never punish physically their children.2
Consistent with the idea that non–material sanctions/rewards promote compliance with
norms, a growing experimental literature has provided evidence that this type of feedback
reduces selfish behavior (we review this literature in the next section). However, it is not yet
clear why this occurs. Note that recent models of other–regarding preferences (see Camerer
1We note that some of the literature uses the term “non–monetary punishment” as a synonym of non–
material sanctions, as in Masclet et al. (2003).
2Of course, non–material rewards and sanctions have the disadvantage that they cannot induce compliance
among those agents who are immune to social approval/disapproval.
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2003 and Fehr and Schmidt 2006 for surveys) cannot explain this phenomenon: Approving
or disapproving an action does not affect the distribution of material resources among the
players or the (ex ante) beliefs in this regard, and the utility in most of these models depends
on one (or both) of these variables.
This paper complements the literature on other–regarding preferences and aims at clari-
fying why approval and disapproval affect behavior. For this, we first propose a simple model
based on the idea that some people feel badly if they expect their actions to be disapproved
by others, whereas they feel well if they expect their actions to be approved –see Holla¨nder
(1990) and Kandel and Lazear (1992) for alternative models. For simplicity, we just refer to
this as the disapproval–aversion (DA) assumption. While this DA hypothesis is important,
we must stress that it cannot explain on its own why the feedback affects behavior. This is
especially clear if the feedback is ex post : Since the expected utility of a player depends on
her ex ante expectations about approval/disapproval and the feedback is provided after the
choice, why should it have an effect on its own? To provide an explanation, we consider two
additional hypotheses: First, players might be more likely to think about the other’s opinions
if there is a feedback stage or some other external factor that somehow forces them to put
on the other player’s shoes (we call this the awareness hypothesis), and second, players might
be averse to effectively receive disapproving messages, which we call the negative information
avoidance (NIA) hypothesis.
In order to test for these hypotheses and to gain further understanding about why feedback
affects behavior, we use the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and three experimental treatments (con-
trol, expectations, and feedback). In the control treatment, subjects simply play a PD game.
In the expectations treatment, we elicit players’ expectations about approval/disapproval
from their co–player before playing the same PD. Finally, the feedback treatment consists of
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a two–stage game. In the first stage, subjects play the PD game. In the second stage (the
feedback stage), they can approve/disapprove the co–player’s prior choice in the PD by means
of a message that has no effect on the receiver’s material payoff.
Our main results are as follows. First, the three treatments allow us to discriminate
whether the awareness and NIA hypotheses are empirically relevant. In effect, suppose to
start with that the awareness factor is individually significant while the NIA factor is not.
In that case, the rate of cooperation should be similar in the expectations and the feedback
treatments (in both treatments, there is an external factor that makes players think about the
approval/disapproval from the co–player), and lower in the control treatment (where there is
no such external factor). If only the NIA factor was individually significant, in contrast, the
level of cooperation should be similar in the control and expectations treatments, but higher
in the feedback treatment (the only one in which players can effectively receive messages). In
short, the comparisons control vs. expectations and expectations vs. feedback capture the net
effect of the awareness and NIA factors, respectively. In addition, the comparison control vs.
feedback evaluates the effect of both factors when they act jointly. In this respect, we only
observe significant differences in the cooperation rate in the comparison control vs. feedback,
but not on the other two comparisons. In other words, the awareness and NIA factors have
a significant effect when they act jointly, but not when they act individually. This suggests
that both forces are necessary to understand why the feedback increases cooperation.
Second, we can also test the DA hypothesis. In effect, the model predicts that if a player
is sufficiently sensitive to being approved and disapproved, and always expects cooperation
to be relatively more approved than defection, then that player should cooperate in the PD.
The expectations treatment allows us to test this prediction. Consistent with our model, we
find that the average cooperator expects cooperation to be relatively more approved than
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defection. Interestingly, this is not necessarily true for those players who defect.
Third, our feedback treatment provides some further insights on approval/disapproval.
On one hand, we observe that cooperation is relatively more approved than defection. How-
ever, cooperators provide a more positive/negative feedback than defectors if their co–player
cooperates/defects. Joined with our second result above, this means that cooperators do not
only expect cooperation to be approved, but also that they approve this kind of behavior. A
similar result is not found for the average defector.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews some related
literature, while Section 3 develops the model of disapproval–aversion. In Section 4, we
present the experimental design and procedures. Section 5 provides experimental evidence on
the prisoner’s dilemma in our three treatments. We conclude in Section 6. The experimental
instructions as well as some additional parametric estimations are relegated to the appendices.
2 Related Literature
As we have noted, one can distinguish between material and non–material rewards/sanctions.
We first mention briefly some of the experimental literature on material rewards and sanc-
tions, which is rather rich –consult Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a more extensive survey.
For instance, Ostrom et al. (1992) show that cooperation can be sustained in repeated social
dilemmas by adding a punishment stage –see also Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000)– and that the
use of sanctions is inversely related to its cost and positively correlated with its effectiveness.
Falk et al. (2005) study the determinants of the occurrence of punishment and argue that
retaliation against unfair behavior is the main explanatory factor (although they stress the
existence of other, secondary factors). Sefton et al. (2007) compare one–to–one reward and
sanction mechanisms in a repeated voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) and find that
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contributions in the punishment treatment are rather stable over time. In contrast, contri-
butions in the rewards treatment are initially high but markedly decrease in later rounds,
maybe because the use of rewards significantly decays over time as well. In the context of a
common pool resource (CPM) game, Vyrastekova and van Soest (2008) find also that one–
to–one rewards are not effective in sustaining cooperation. However, this is not true when
the impact ratio is 1 : 3. As in the case of sanctions, therefore, this suggests that the impact
ratio is crucial to understand the efficiency of rewards.
The evidence on non–material sanctions/rewards is less abundant, although increasing.
For instance, Masclet et al. (2003) study a repeated VCM with a punishment stage and
compare one treatment with material sanctions with another one with non–material sanctions,
which were implemented through the assignment of costless (and non–costly) “disapproval
points”. They report that both types of sanctions were effective in promoting contributions
to the public good, although material sanctions were more effective over time. In addition,
Noussair and Tucker (2005) show that contributions to the public good are higher when
both types of sanctions are present than if just one of the two types is available. Rege
and Telle (2004) report that contributions to a one–shot public good game played among
strangers are significantly higher when individual contributions are made public at the end of
the game, thus facilitating social approval/disapproval –in contrast, Ga¨chter and Fehr (1999)
do not observe this phenomenon in a 10–period public good game. Peeters and Vorsatz
(2009) suggest that players in a repeated public good game with partners matching use
non–material rewards/sanctions as a signaling device for the next round, which sometimes
increases contributions. Dugar (2008) examines a coordination game with several Pareto–
ranked equilibria and two treatments: One with only non–material sanctions and another one
with only non–material rewards. He reports a gradual convergence towards the most efficient
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equilibrium in the first treatment, but the opposite result in the approval treatment. Hence,
approval and disapproval have asymmetric behavioral effects on coordination. Furthermore,
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) show that the average giving in one–shot dictator games
increases if recipients can send an open–form, written message to the dictator after observing
her choice. Finally, Xiao and Houser (2009) report the same phenomenon even if dictators
are not required to read the message. Based on previous literature, they suggest that players
could form their expectations about approval and disapproval in a self–serving manner, and
find their data consistent with the hypothesis that self–serving biases are diminished if players
can receive ex post feedback.
3 Disapproval–Aversion: A Toy Model
This section offers a simple model based on the idea that people feel well/badly if their
choices are approved/disapproved by another person. The model applies to any two–player,
extensive form game. Let N = {1, 2} denote the set of players and s = (s1, s2) a profile of
pure strategies belonging to the strategy space S = S1 × S2. Let u(s) = (u1(s), u2(s)) be the
vector of utilities that ensues if s is played. The corresponding vector of monetary payoffs
is denoted by pi(s) = (pi1(s), pi2(s)). Players act rational (and there is common knowledge
thereof), in the sense that they maximize their expected utility given their beliefs about the
other player’s choices.
We posit that players care about their own monetary payoff but also about whether the
other player approves or disapproves their behavior. More precisely, let Iji (s) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
be an indicator function that takes the value −1 if strategy si of player i is disapproved by
player j (j 6= i) at s ∈ S, value 0 if that behavior is neither approved nor disapproved by
player j, and value 1 if it is approved by player j. Given this, we assume that the utility
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function of player i is ui(s) = pii(s) + γi I
j
i (s), where γi ≥ 0. In other words, a player suffers
a psychological cost of γi if the other person thinks badly of her behavior, while she gets
a psychological reward of the same amount if her co–player approves her behavior.3 For
brevity, we just refer to this assumption by saying that players are disapproval–averse (DA).
The psychological intuition behind this assumption is twofold: First, humans construct their
self–image partly by resorting to others’ opinions (see Festinger, 1954), and second, a negative
self–image triggers negative emotions like shame, inferiority feelings, or low self–esteem, while
a positive self–image triggers positive feelings like pride.
We also assume that the population consists of a continuum of DA types who differ in
their γi. In particular, the model includes the case γi = 0. Of course, this corresponds to
the homo economicus, selfish type whose utility only depends on her own monetary payoff.
We also assume that a player’s type is private information and denote by ρ(γ) the commonly
known probability that player i has a γi of at least γ. Obviously, ρ(0) = 1 and lim
γ→∞
ρ(γ)→ 0.
To illustrate some implications of the DA hypothesis, we consider first some games where
players are anonymous and cannot communicate in any manner –hence, they cannot exchange
verbal or written messages, or even observe facial expressions. In these games, obviously,
players are uncertain about the other player’s opinion –i.e., about the specific value of Iji (s).
Nevertheless, we assume that they have, for any possible strategy profile, some expectations
on whether the co–player (privately) approves her choice. Given such expectations, players
maximize their expected utility Ei(u(s)) = E(pii(s))+ γi E(I
j
i (s)), where E(I
j
i (s)) denotes the
ex ante expectation on Iji (si, sj), or the expected approval rate of si (given that j plays sj).
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3Assuming that approval and disapproval have the same absolute effect on utility is an obvious simplification.
In fact, one possible interpretation of the evidence from Dugar (2008) is that people are relatively less sensitive
to approval than to disapproval. This could be incorporated into the model by making parameter γi dependent
on the value of the indicator Iji (s), and more precisely, smaller when I
j
i (s) = 1. Given that this assumption is
not essential for our posterior analysis, we have nevertheless opted for the symmetric specification.
4The previous notation implicitly indicates that the probability that some player j approves a given choice
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We start with a simple example: A binary dictator game in which the dictator i chooses
between the (dictator, dummy) monetary allocations (200,120) and (160,160). To insist, note
that the dictator is in this game uncertain about the dummy’s opinion. Let then α200 ∈ [−1, 1]
and α160 ∈ [−1, 1] be the expected approval rates of the respective choices. Given this, the
dictator picks the egalitarian allocation (160,160) if, and only if, 160+γi α160 > 200+γi α200,
which is equivalent to (α160 − α200) γi > 40. In other words, allocation (160,160) will be
chosen only if γi is large enough and this choice is expected to be approved more often than
the selfish choice (α160 − α200 > 0).
As a second example of a game without communication (now more suited to our posterior
experimental analysis), consider the one–shot prisoner’s dilemma game (PD) of Figure 1,
where monetary payoffs satisfy t > c > d > 0 and 2c > t.
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (c, c) (0, t)
Defect (t, 0) (d, d)
Figure 1: Prisoner’s dilemma game.
Since defection strictly dominates cooperation in monetary terms, it is clear that a selfish
player i should always defect. A player with γi > 0, however, cooperates under certain
conditions. To show this, let αCD ∈ [−1, 1] be the expected approval rate of a player who
cooperates when the other player defects (αCC , αDD, and αDC are analogously defined). If
the co–player is expected to cooperate with probability δ, it follows that the average expected
approval rate of a player who cooperates, or expected approval rate of cooperation αC(δ),
equals αC(δ) = δ αCC + (1 − δ) αCD. Analogously, her expected approval rate of defection
does not depends on her γj so that we do not need to condition E(I
j
i (s)) on the distribution of γ in the
population. While this assumption simplifies the exposition, it is not necessary for our results.
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equals αD(δ) = δαDC+(1−δ)αDD . Under the hypothesis that cooperation is always expected
to be more approved than defection, Proposition 1 determines the non–empty set of types
who cooperate in the PD.
Proposition 1 If αC(δ) > αD(δ) for any δ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a γ
∗ > 0 so that player i
contributes in the PD game if, and only if, γi ≥ γ
∗.
Proof: In what follows, we show that the types with γi ≥ γ
∗ find cooperation strictly domi-
nant under this condition. In effect, provided that the co-player cooperates with probability
δ, it follows that player i’s expected utility from cooperation is equal to
δ (c+ γi αCC) + (1− δ) γi αCD = δ c+ γi αC(δ).
On the other hand, if she defects her expected utility is
δ (t+ γi αDC) + (1− δ) (d+ γi αDD) = δ t+ (1− δ) d+ γi αD(δ).
Consequently, cooperation is optimal if and only if
δ c+ γi αC(δ) ≥ δ t+ (1− δ) d+ γi αD(δ)⇔ γi (αC(δ)− αD(δ)) ≥ δ (t− c− d) + d.
Now, since αC(δ) − αD(δ) > 0 for any δ by assumption, the previous expression can be
rewritten as
γi ≥
δ (t− c− d) + d
αC(δ) − αD(δ)
≡ γ∗.
Consequently, cooperation is optimal for player i if, and only if, γi ≥ γ
∗. It follows that a
proportion δ = ρ(γ∗) of players cooperate in the PD. 
In other words: If a player always expects cooperation to be relatively more approved
than defection, she cooperates if her γi is sufficiently high. Conversely, if a player does not
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expect αC(δ) > αD(δ) for any δ, she will defect independently of her type. This suggests
that belief heterogeneity may play a role in explaining behavioral differences. Finally, one
can prove that there may exist several equilibria if αC(δ) > αD(δ) for some but not for all δ.
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Suppose now that players can provide feedback in the PD. Should that foster cooperation?
Since players can obtain information about approval/disapproval in that case, one might be
tempted to believe that our model predicts a positive effect on cooperation, even if players
communicate after all other choices have been made. However, we can show with a simple
example that disapproval–aversion alone predicts no change in behavior. The example corre-
sponds to a game with two stages: In the first stage, the PD game of Figure 1 is played; in
the second stage, each player observes the co–player’s prior choice and sends then a message
expressing approval or disapproval of that choice. In other words, players can non–materially
punish or reward the co–player after playing the PD game. Applying our model to this game
is direct: Since ex post messages cannot alter the expected approval rates of cooperation and
defection αC(δ) and αD(δ), it follows that they cannot affect the ex ante expected utility
either (they may affect the ex post utility, but this is irrelevant here). As a result, adding the
feedback stage has no effect on the cooperation rate.
However, we know from the experimental literature that the addition of a feedback stage
increases the overall cooperation rate. To explain this phenomenon, we complement the model
with two possible factors. First, it could be that some agents do not become aware about
the co–player’s opinions unless they are somehow reminded about this by an external factor;
for instance, the mere availability of the feedback might help agents to focus on the other
player’s opinions. This implies that some agents might act as if their γi was large only if
5A formal proof is available on request. In any case, the experimental evidence provided later indicates
that the average cooperative player expects αC(δ) > αD(δ) for any δ. Hence, Proposition 1 applies to them.
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their awareness was increased by some external factor, but not otherwise. More precisely, we
model this idea as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1 (Awareness): The probability ρ(γ∗) increases if an external factor makes
players think about the other player’s opinion.
Second, players might not behave as standard expected utility maximizers when choosing
under uncertainty, but feel regret (Loomes and Sugden, 1982). This means that if a player
makes an uncertain choice and the consequence of that choice happens to be bad, she feels
badly by reflecting on how much better her position would have been had she chosen differ-
ently. For instance, a player might regret her choice if it is disapproved by another player.
Consequently, a player who feels regret should prefer a lottery where she is disapproved with
some probability but she is not informed about the resolution of the uncertainty to another
lottery that only differs from the former in that she is informed ex post whether she is actually
disapproved –e.g., by receiving a disapproving message. We model this idea by implicitly as-
suming that players become more sensitive (i.e., increase their γi) if they can receive feedback
about others’ opinions. More precisely, we have the following negative information avoidance
(NIA) hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2 (NIA): The probability ρ(γ∗) increases if players can receive ex post in-
formation about others’ approval/disapproval.
To summarize, our model is based on three key hypotheses that might explain why indi-
viduals cooperate in the PD (the DA hypothesis) and why feedback affects behavior (the DA
hypothesis joint with the awareness and/or NIA hypothesis). Our experiment will shed some
light on the empirical validity of these assumptions. Before presenting our design, however,
we briefly compare our model with some alternative specifications that seek to introduce ap-
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proval/disapproval in the utility function. This comparison can further clarify the insights
behind our model.
Two seminal papers have formalized the idea that people care about approval/disapproval
from others. To start with, Ho¨llander (1990) considers a setting in which n identical agents
must decide how much of their endowment to contribute to a collective good. Agents obtain
utility from their private consumption, the collective good, and the approval from other
agents. In this regard, Ho¨llander posits that approval is a continuous variable that depends
positively on the agent’s contribution to the collective good b and on the comparative value
b− c, where c denotes the average contribution. That is, agents are more approved the more
they contribute, and receive additional approval if they contribute above the average.
In turn, Kandel and Lazear (1992) consider a team of n workers who can put some costly
effort ei to produce a joint output f(e1, e2, ..., en), which is later distributed equally among
the workers. Workers are identical and their utility depends on their share of output, the cost
of exerting effort, and a psychological cost or peer pressure P . Several formalizations of this
cost are discussed. If P depends negatively on the worker’s own effort, then the worse one
feels the less one contributes. In addition, the cost might increase if the worker exerts less
effort than the average worker, or if she is monitored by other workers.
There are several differences between these models and ours. First, we provide a gen-
eral, game–theoretical model for two–player games. Among other things, this allows us to
explicitly model communication and observability in detail.6 Second, our model permits a
priori any pattern of approval and disapproval. The previous models, in contrast, hypothesize
6We note a subtle point in this regard. When we think about monitoring/observing another player, we are
likely to think about being physically present while that player makes her choice. In this setting, players can
provide feedback through verbal or facial communication. In many games, however, one can observe another
player’s action just by observing the final output, even if one is not physically present. Since it is more difficult
to provide feedback in this latter case, the two settings are qualitatively different. Our model recognizes this
difference by means of the NIA hypothesis.
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that people are relatively more approved/disapproved when they behave more/less coopera-
tively than the average player. While this hypothesis might be in principle an appealling one
(particularly in multiple–player games), our experimental data shows that people are rather
heterogeneous with regard to what they approve/disapprove: We will see, for instance, that
many defectors in the prisoner’s dilemma disapprove cooperation. This leads to our third
point: Heterogeneity, which our model allows for, seems crucial to understand actual behav-
ioral patterns.7 Note finally that the model by Ho¨llander (1990) cannot explain why the
availability of feedback decreases selfish behavior, for the same reasons why our DA hypothe-
sis alone cannot explain it either. None of them makes any assumption akin to the awareness
or NIA hypotheses.
To finish, it can be worthy to compare the idea of disapproval–aversion with that of guilt–
aversion –as in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007). Guilt–averse players suffer a cost if they
choose what the co–player does not expect. In contrast, disapproval–averse players suffer a
cost if they do what the co–player disapproves (even if the co–player expects that choice).
Another key difference is that models of guilt–aversion posit that preferences depend directly
on beliefs and hence are based on the Psychological Game Theory of Geanakoplos et al.
(1989). This is not the case in our model: People care about being approved/disapproved,
and their expectations in this regard affect expected utility. Note also that guilt–aversion
cannot explain why ex post feedback affects behavior.
4 Experimental Design and Procedures
Our experimental study consists of three treatments (control, expectations, and feedback). In
the control treatment, participants are randomly and anonymously matched into pairs and
7While Proposition 1 emphasizes heterogeneity in the sensitivity to the feedback (parameter γi), it also
suggests that heterogeneity in the expectations about approval/disapproval is important as well.
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play a single round of the PD presented in Figure 2. In order to avoid the terms “cooperate”
and “defect”, actions are respectively labelled X and Y instead. The numbers in the payoff
matrix are in terms of ECU (experimental currency units), where 20 ECU equals 1 Euro.
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (180, 180) (80, 260)
Defect (260, 80) (100, 100)
Figure 2: Specification of the PD game.
In the expectations treatment, subjects also play the previous PD. Before making their
choice, however, they are asked what they expect their co–player will think about their choice
for any possible outcome of the game. More precisely, each subject is asked four questions
like the following one: “If I choose X and the other participant chooses X, he/she believes
that my choice was (1) good, (2) neither good nor bad, (3) bad.” Subjects are not paid for
answering these questions.
Finally, in the feedback treatment subjects play the PD game of Figure 2 as well, but
after observing the outcome of the game, they are given the opportunity to send one costly
message to the other player (the cost of sending the message is 10 ECU). More precisely,
each subject can choose one of the following three messages: “Your choice was (1) good, (2)
neither good nor bad, (3) bad”. To implement the feedback, we employ the strategy method;
that is, subjects are asked for any possible contingency in the PD whether they want to pay
the message fee and, independently of their answer, which message they would send in case
they decided to pay the fee (of course, the co–player would only receive the message if the
fee had been paid). We opted for the strategy method in order to maximize the amount of
statistical evidence. Since the experiment was computerized and subjects were not warned
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about the arrival of a message (if any) in their screens, they could not avoid reading it.
We chose the PD for our experiment due to its simplicity. Further, our three treatments
permit us to explore the empirical validity of our three key hypotheses. To start, the DA
hypothesis can be tested with the expectations treatment, as our analysis in Proposition 1
predicts a certain correlation between expectations and cooperation (a player should defect
if cooperation is not expected to be approved more than defection, but she may cooperate
otherwise). Further, the net effect of the awareness and NIA hypotheses can be evaluated
by pairwise comparisons of our treatments. In effect, awareness (but not NIA) could ex-
plain a significantly higher cooperation rate in expectations vs. control, while an increase in
cooperation from expectations to feedback would be consistent with NIA.
We conducted the experiment, which was programmed within the z-Tree toolbox provided
by Fischbacher (2007), in the computer laboratory at Maastricht University. Since all students
from the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration have an e–mail account associated
with their student ID, we promoted the experiment mainly via electronic newsletters and
gave students the opportunity to register online for their preferred session. In total, 180
undergraduates participated in the experiment. Since some students did not show up, 58
students participated in the control, 60 in the feedback, and 62 in the expectations treatment.
No student took part in more than one session.
Each session proceeded as follows. In the beginning, subjects were randomly and anony-
mously matched into pairs. Each subject received instruction sheets depending on the treat-
ment, an official payment receipt, and a set of control questions.8 Subjects could study the
instructions at their own pace and eventually occurring doubts were privately clarified. The
experiment started once everybody answered all control questions correctly. After making
8The instructions corresponding to the feedback treatment can be found in the Appendix.
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their choices in the corresponding PD game of each treatment (in the subjects’ instructions,
this was referred to as scenario 1), subjects played in addition five dictator games with feed-
back (scenarios 2-6); we report the results from these games in another paper. Participants
in any treatment were initially informed that they would play six games, without providing
any information about the structure of the five dictator games. Moreover, subjects knew that
they would be randomly re–matched with another player after making their choices in the
first scenario, that their decisions in scenario 1 would not affect their payoffs in any other
scenario, and that they would not receive any information regarding the decisions of any
other player until the end of the experiment (note that the use of the strategy method in the
feedback treatment made this possible). In theory, therefore, behavior in the PD game in
each treatment could not be affected by the existence of the additional games. After playing
scenario 1, subjects were effectively re-matched and received new instruction sheets for the
dictator games. In each treatment, and in order to prevent income effects, only one game
among the PD game and the five dictator games was randomly selected for payment (subjects
knew this from the beginning). At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed about
their co–player’s actions in the payoff–relevant game. The average payment for the 45 minutes
session was about 9 Euros.
5 Experimental Evidence
Our experimental design allows us to test several implications of the model. First of all,
Proposition 1 indicates that players with a sufficiently high γi should cooperate if that choice
is expected to be relatively more approved than defection. Consequently, we use the data
from the expectations treatment to study whether the assumption αC(δ) − αD(δ) > 0 holds
within the group of cooperators for all δ ∈ [0, 1]. We have the following result.
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Result 1 (Expectations & Cooperation): In the expectations treatment, cooperation is
on average expected to be significantly more approved than defection. This result still holds for
the subjects who actually cooperate, but not necessarily for the subjects who actually defect.
This is because actual cooperators are more likely to expect approval (disapproval) when both
players cooperate (defect) potentially.
Evidence on Result 1: We present first some aggregate data on the subjects’ expectations
about approval/disapproval. More precisely, Table 1 shows the proportion of subjects who
expect their potential choice to be approved or disapproved, depending on the other player’s
potential choice –recall that we elicited the players’ expectations in this regard for any pos-
sible strategy vector. For instance, the column corresponding to the strategy vector (C,C)
indicates that more than 67% of the subjects expect to be approved if they cooperate and
the other player cooperates as well, while around 14% expect to be disapproved in this case.9
Note that these percentages do not add up to 1 because some subjects expected their choice
neither to be approved nor disapproved. In each column, we also indicate the p–values of the
one–sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests that compare the approval and disapproval rates for
the corresponding strategy vector.
(C,C) (C,D) (D,C) (D,D)
Approval 0.6774 0.4193 0.3548 0.1935
[0.0000] [0.2552] [0.0136] [0.0322]
Disapproval 0.1451 0.5322 0.6290 0.3870
Table 1: Expectations about how the co–player evaluates one’s own action (in percentages). The first of the
two actions of an outcome always corresponds to the player who assesses the expectation. In brackets, the
one–sided p–values of the Wilcoxon signed rank tests that compare the equality of the approval and disapproval
rate for a given outcome.
9The latter expectations are somehow surprising. All subjects with these kind of expectations actually
defect in the PD (see the next table). They might believe that cooperation is always the wrong choice
(perhaps because they see it as a dominated strategy), and they expect the co–player to believe this as well.
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From this, we infer the following aggregate patterns: (a) The average expectation of ap-
proval αCC –i.e., the difference between the percentage of people who approve and those who
disapprove in the (C,C) column– is significantly larger than zero so that the average subject
expects approval to be more likely than disapproval if both subjects cooperate potentially,
(b) αDD and αDC are both significantly smaller than zero, and (c) αCD does not differ sig-
nificantly from zero. As the reader can easily verify, all this implies that the average subject
expects cooperation to be always significantly more approved than defection.
While this aggregate data suggests some general tendencies, one must note that there
exists certain heterogeneity. For instance, many subjects expect to be disapproved if they
cooperate unilaterally, but a similar proportion expects to be approved in this case. So, the
question arises if there is a relation between actual behavior and expectations. In particular,
is it true that the average cooperator expects αC(δ) − αD(δ) > 0 for any δ ∈ [0, 1] as de-
manded by Proposition 1? To answer these kind of questions we disaggregate expectations,
distinguishing between the subjects who actually cooperate and those who actually defect.
The following table also indicates the p–values of the one–sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests
that compare the approval and disapproval rates for each strategy vector.
Expectations of Cooperators Expectations of Defectors
Approval Disapproval Approval Disapproval
(C,C) 0.8888 [0.0001] 0.0000 0.5909 [0.0020] 0.2045
(C,D) 0.3888 [0.2418] 0.5555 0.4318 [0.2709] 0.5227
(D,C) 0.4444 [0.3276] 0.5555 0.3181 [0.0111] 0.6590
(D,D) 0.0555 [0.0020] 0.6111 0.2500 [0.3416] 0.2954
Table 2: Expectations for the group of cooperators and the group of defectors about how the co–player
evaluates one’s own action (in percentages). The first of the two actions of an outcome always corresponds to
the player who assesses the expectation. In brackets, the one–sided p–values of the Wilcoxon signed rank tests
that compare the equality of the approval and disapproval rate for a given outcome and group.
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Table 2 shows that (a) αCC is significantly greater than zero for both subgroups, (b) αCD
is in both groups smaller than zero but not significantly so, (c) αDC is significantly smaller
than zero for the group of defectors but not for the group of cooperators, and (d) αDD is
significantly smaller than zero for the cooperators but not for the defectors. From this, it can
be concluded that the average cooperator expects cooperation to be relatively more approved
than defection for any belief δ that the co–player cooperates; that is, αC(δ) > αD(δ) for all
δ ∈ [0, 1]. Interestingly, the data and in particular the above mentioned result (d) imply that
αC(δ) > αD(δ) does not always hold for the average defector, especially if she expects the
co–player to defect (i.e., if δ is close to zero).
To investigate the differences between both subgroups in more detail, we first analyze
whether the average expectations differ across them. Using Mann–Whitney U tests, we find
that αCD (p = 0.3959, one-sided) and αDC (p = 0.2008, one-sided) do not differ significantly
across the two subgroups. On the other hand, αCC is significantly larger (i.e., more positive)
for the cooperators (p = 0.0087, one–sided), while αDD is significantly smaller (i.e., more
negative) for the cooperators (p = 0.0069, one–sided). That is, cooperators are more likely to
expect approval (disapproval) if both players cooperate (defect).
In a further level of disaggregation, Table 3 provides for each subgroup information on
how cooperation is expected to be evaluated relative to defection keeping the co–player’s
choice constant. Since subjects can provide three levels of evaluation (approval, neutral, dis-
approval), we distinguish five possible levels of comparison {+2,+1, 0,−1,−2}; for example,
the value +2 is obtained if a subject expects cooperation to be approved and defection to be
disapproved, 0 is obtained if both actions are expected to be evaluated equally, and so on.
The table also includes the p–values of the one–sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests that analyze
whether the mean of a distribution is different from zero.
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Expectations of Cooperators Expectations of Defectors
+2 +1 0 -1 -2 +2 +1 0 -1 -2
αCC − αDC 0.50 0.06 0.39 0.06 0.00 0.45 0.14 0.23 0.04 0.14
Mean: 1.00 [0.0020] Mean: 0.72 [0.0013]
αCD − αDD 0.28 0.11 0.39 0.17 0.05 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.23 0.20
Mean: 0.40 [0.1190] Mean: -0.02 [0.4151]
Table 3: Frequencies of relative expectations for the group of cooperators and the group of defectors about
how cooperation is evaluated relative to defection by the co–player (keeping the co–player’s action constant).
The first of the two actions of an outcome always corresponds to the player who assesses the expectation.
In brackets, the one–sided p–values of the Wilcoxon signed–rank tests that analyze whether the mean of the
distribution is different from zero.
We see that 50% of the cooperators expect cooperation to be approved and defection to
be disapproved when the co–player is assumed to cooperate, while 45% of the defectors share
the same expectations. An interesting point is that some subjects expect cooperation to be
evaluated worse than defection, especially when the co–player is expected to defect (see, the
line αCD −αDD). In fact, 43% of all actual defectors and 22% of all actual cooperators hold
that kind of expectation. Incidentally, Proposition 1 does not apply to these cooperators, as
they do not always expect cooperation to be relatively more approved than defection. Thus,
not all cooperative behavior seems to be motivated by disapproval–aversion. 
While the data from the expectations treatment allowed us to test an implication of the
DA hypothesis, the feedback treatment provides evidence on which kind of behavior is actually
approved/disapproved, and who disapproves which behavior. Note that our model is silent
in this respect as it does not impose any particular feedback pattern. We find the following.
Result 2 (Feedback & Cooperation): In the feedback treatment, cooperation is approved
significantly more often than defection. This finding is more pronounced for the subjects who
actually cooperate than for those who actually defect.
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Evidence on Result 2: We present first some aggregate data. Table 4 presents the hy-
pothetical messages that subjects sent to the co–player in the feedback treatment for every
possible strategy vector of the PD (recall that we used the strategy method to elicit these
messages). For instance, column (C,C) of the table indicates that 65% of the subjects would
approve the other player’s choice if both cooperated, while around 1.6% would disapprove in
this case (the rest of the subjects would neither approve nor disapprove). To analyze whether
the approval and disapproval rates are identical for some strategy vector, we use again one–
sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests. Since all p–values are smaller than 0.05, the clear tendency
is that subjects approve potential cooperators and disapprove potential defectors.
(C,C) (C,D) (D,C) (D,D)
Approval rate 0.6500 0.1166 0.4833 0.1500
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0004] [0.0212]
Disapproval rate 0.0166 0.5833 0.2000 0.3333
Table 4: Percentages of hypothetical messages in the feedback treatment. The first of the two actions of an
outcome always corresponds to the sender of the message. In brackets, the one–sided p–values of the Wilcoxon
signed rank tests that compare the equality of the approval and disapproval rate for a given outcome.
Note that Table 4 is based on hypothetical messages. To actually send the message for
a certain outcome of the PD game, however, a subject had to agree to pay a 10 ECU fee.
One reason that motivated us to introduce this fee was that some subjects might choose
randomly between messages if they were costless, and that could contaminate the analysis.
By comparing the message pattern of those players who are willing to pay the fee at a certain
outcome with the corresponding hypothetical pattern, we can get some evidence that subjects
did not make choices randomly. Indeed our results are not much different. In case both
subjects cooperate potentially, ten players are willing to pay the fee; eight of them send an
approving message and the other two a neutral one. If the other player defects unilaterally, ten
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players are willing to pay the fee; nine players send a negative message and one player sends
a positive one. If the other player cooperates unilaterally, seven players are willing to pay the
fee; four messages are positive, one is neutral, and the other two are negative. Finally, if both
subjects defect potentially, three players are willing to pay the fee; one message is negative
and the other two are neutral.10 It is worth noticing that cooperators are significantly more
likely than defectors (0.2173 vs. 0.0810) to pay the 10 ECU fee to send a message, as a Z–test
shows (p = 0.0020, one–sided).
While there is a clear tendency in the approval/disapproval patterns, Table 4 also suggests
some heterogeneity. One possible reason might be the existence of some correlation between
the behavior in the PD game and the approving/disapproving behavior. To clarify this, we
analyze separately the frequency of messages within the group of cooperators and the group
of defectors. The relevant results are displayed in Table 5.
Feedback from Cooperators Feedback from Defectors
Approval Disapproval Approval Disapproval
(C,C) 0.7821 [0.0000] 0.0000 0.5675 [0.0000] 0.0270
(C,D) 0.0434 [0.0001] 0.7391 0.1621 [0.0075] 0.4864
(D,C) 0.5217 [0.0110] 0.1304 0.4594 [0.0600] 0.2432
(D,D) 0.1304 [0.0486] 0.4347 0.1621 [0.1659] 0.2702
Table 5: Percentages of hypothetical messages from the group of cooperators and the group of defectors. The
first of the two actions of an outcome always corresponds to the sender of the message. In brackets, the one–
sided p-values of the Wilcoxon signed rank tests that compare the equality of the approval and disapproval
rate for a given outcome and group.
We see that in both subgroups, the approval rate of cooperation is greater than zero
while that of defection is smaller than zero. Only within the group of defectors, αDD and
10Due to the limited number of observations, tests on actual messages are not very powerful. However,
we observe that the ratio positive messages/negative messages is significantly greater than zero (p = 0.0030,
one–sided) for the outcome (C,C); significantly smaller than zero (p = 0.0067, one–sided) for the outcome
(C,D); and, not significantly different from zero (p = 0.2420, one–sided) for the outcome (D,C). Finally, no
meaningful test can be performed for the outcome (D,D) because we only have three independent observations
in that case.
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αDC (defined now as rates of actual approval) do not turn out to be significantly different
from zero at the five percent significance level. If we compare the approval rates across the
two subgroups, we find the following results. First, cooperators are significantly more likely
to approve in case of mutual cooperation (p = 0.0432, one–sided Mann-Whitney U test).
Further, cooperators are also more likely to disapprove defection, as αCD is significantly more
negative for that group (p = 0.0228, one–sided). On the other hand, αDD and αDC do not
differ significantly across groups (p = 0.1270 for each, one–sided). This evidence indicates
that, as suggested above, there exists a relation between behavior and messages. That is,
cooperators are more likely to approve cooperation and disapprove defection.
We can further clarify this point and provide more detailed evidence on individual behav-
ior with the help of Table 6, which indicates how subjects in each subgroup rank cooperation
and defection by the co–player, keeping their own choice constant. The five possible rankings
{+2,+1, 0,−1,−2} have an analogous interpretation as in Table 3.
Feedback from Cooperators Feedback from Defectors
+2 +1 0 -1 -2 +2 +1 0 -1 -2
αCC − αCD 0.65 0.22 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.43 0.16 0.27 0.11 0.03
Mean: 1.48 [0.0001] Mean: 0.85 [0.0002]
αDC − αDD 0.35 0.13 0.39 0.13 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.43 0.14 0.05
Mean: 0.70 [0.0067] Mean: 0.23 [0.0487]
Table 6: Frequencies of relative feedback (hypothetical messages) from the group of cooperators and the group
of defectors about how cooperation is evaluated relative to defection (keeping the player’s action constant).
The first of the two actions of an outcome always corresponds to the sender of the message. In brackets, the
one–sided p–values of the Wilcoxon signed–rank tests that analyze whether the mean of the distribution is
different from zero.
It can be seen from the first line, for example, that 65% of the cooperators approve co-
operation and disapprove defection (ranking +2) provided that they themselves cooperate,
whereas 43% of the defectors express these ranking in the hypothetical case that they cooper-
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ate. Also, the means of the distributions indicate, as we have already seen before, that actual
cooperators are more likely to rank cooperation higher than defection, especially in case they
cooperate. In this sense, the results from this table confirm our previous analysis. 
So far, we have found some evidence in line with the hypothesis that some individuals
are disapproval–averse. Moreover, we have observed that cooperation is more likely to be
approved than defection (in particular among the cooperators) and that cooperators are
more likely to provide feedback if it is costly. Also, if Tables 1 and 4 are compared, it can be
observed that expectations are on average rather correct. In particular, subjects anticipate
in the expectations treatment correctly that cooperators are more likely to be approved than
disapproved while defectors are more likely to be disapproved than approved. In what follows,
we investigate whether the possibility to send feedback increases cooperation and, if so, why
that occurs. More precisely, we test here the awareness and the NIA hypotheses presented in
Section 3. Each of these assumptions predicts a rise in cooperation in the feedback treatment,
although their predictions differ for the expectations treatment. Thus, the idea that subjects
want to avoid information about bad events (the NIA hypothesis) implies the following pattern
for the cooperation rate (note that subjects do not receive information about disapproval in
the expectations and control treatments):
Feedback > Expectations = Control.
In contrast, if the feedback mainly works by making subjects aware of the other player’s
opinion (the awareness hypothesis), we should observe the following result:
Feedback = Expectations > Control.
To understand this prediction, note that subjects in the expectations treatment must think
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about their co–player’s opinions because their expectations in this respect are elicited.11 In
the feedback treatment, in turn, subjects should also think about their co–player’s opinions
because they are explicitly told in the instructions that the co–player will afterwards have
the opportunity to submit a message announcing their opinion (approval/disapproval). Our
implicit assumption is that subjects become equally aware about their co–player’s opinion in
both treatments.
Obviously, it is also possible that both the awareness and the NIA factor play an indi-
vidually significant role in explaining the feedback effect. In this case, the following pattern
with respect to the cooperation rate should be observed:
Feedback > Expectations > Control.
Finally, suppose that neither factor matters on its own but they are jointly significant.
Then, we should observe more cooperation in the feedback treatment than in the control
treatment, while, at the same time, all comparisons with respect to the expectations treatment
turn out to be insignificant; that is,
Feedback > Control; Expectations = Control; Expectations=Feedback.
Our final result shows that the data indeed coincides with this very last case.
Result 3 (NIA & Awareness): The following pattern is observed: The cooperation rate in
the feedback treatment is larger than cooperation rate in the expectations treatment, which, in
turn, is larger than the cooperation rate in the control treatment. However, only the difference
between the feedback and the control treatment is significant.
11Asking players about the co–player’s opinion might have a potential side effect, as they might think as well
about how the co–player would choose. This is because expectations about approval/disapproval are somehow
based on expectations about choices. Now, some evidence suggests that players change their behavior if they
become more aware about the co–player’s expected choice (see Croson, 2000). This could affect our estimation
of the awareness factor, but it seems impossible at the present to separate both phenomena.
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Evidence on Result 3: Figure 3 below shows the cooperation rate for each of the three
treatments. It is highest in the feedback treatment (38.33%), followed by the expectations
(29.03%) and the control treatment (22.41%). Hence, the mere possibility to send a costly
message that approves or disapproves the choice of the other player increases the overall
level of cooperation. Further, asking subjects to evaluate their own behavior in the eyes of
the other player (the expectations treatment) also increases cooperation with respect to the
control treatment but less than the feedback treatment does. Also remember that the strictly




















Figure 3: Levels of cooperation across treatments. To the left, the control treatment; in the middle, the
expectations treatment; and to the right, the feedback treatment.
Using Mann–Whitney U tests, we obtain that the level of cooperation in the feedback
treatment is significantly higher than in the control treatment (p=0.0461, one–sided). On
the other hand, the level of cooperation in the expectations treatment is not significantly
different from either the control treatment (p=0.2059, one–sided) or the feedback treatment
(p=0.1864, one–sided). 
The fact that the cooperation rate increases across treatments suggests that both the NIA
and the awareness assumption play a role. However, the effect of these forces is only significant
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when they act jointly (the difference in cooperation rates is significant only between the control
and feedback treatments). It seems, therefore, that the availability of approval/disapproval
affects behavior because it makes players think about the other player’s opinion and because
players do not like to be effectively informed about disapproval.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied why individuals behave more cooperatively when their co–
players have the possibility to approve/disapprove their actions. Our main working hypothesis
was that some individuals are disapproval–averse, meaning that they feel badly if others
think badly of their behavior. It turned out that disapproval–aversion is able to explain
why some individuals cooperate in the absence of monetary incentives to do so, however, at
the same time it is not sufficient to establish why the level of cooperation is higher in the
presence of non–material sanctions/rewards. In effect, since feedback is often provided after
choices have been made, it cannot influence ex ante expectations about disapproval (which
is the decisive variable). As a possible explanation for recent experimental findings, we have
therefore considered two additional factors: First, the mere availability of the feedback might
help some subjects to focus on the other player’s opinion, and second, people might be averse
to effectively receive negative information (maybe because they feel regret in that case).
To distinguish between these factors, we ran three different experimental treatments: In
the control treatment, subjects played a standard prisoner’s dilemma game; in the expecta-
tions treatment, subjects were asked in addition –for every possible contingency of the game–
how their co-player would think about their behavior before taking a definite action; finally,
in the feedback treatment, subjects were allowed to approve/disapprove the action of their
co–player. Our main experimental results have been as follows: First, the experimental data
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is in line with the assumption that some players are disapproval–averse, because the coopera-
tion rate in the control treatment is strictly positive and in the expectations treatment, most
cooperators expect cooperation to be approved and defection to be disapproved; second, in the
feedback treatment, actual cooperators approve/disapprove potential cooperators/defectors
more than actual defectors do; and third, since the cooperation rate in the PD is highest in
the feedback treatment, lowest in the control treatment, and reaches a medium level in the
expectations treatment but only the difference between the feedback and the control treat-
ment is significant, it is suggested that the possibility to give feedback fosters cooperation
because it increases awareness and because players dislike receiving negative information.
The analysis here suggests several lines for future research. First of all, more experimental
research is warranted; in particular, it seems important to study what kind of behaviors people
actually approve/disapprove, but also how expectations about this are formed. Second, our
model could be used to explain other experimental facts, like the role of anonymity in dictator
games and public good games (Hoffman et al. 1994, Bohnet and Frey 1999, Dana et al.
2006, and Tadelis 2008). Further, one could incorporate additional motivations like inequity
aversion (as in Fehr and Schmidt 1999) into the model in order to explain other important
experimental phenomena like the use of material sanctions, conditional cooperation, etc. In
addition, the model could also be extended to account for the fact that we particularly care
about the approval or disapproval from close relatives and friends, and less from distant others
(i.e., the parameter γi could depend on the co–player’s identity). Finally, one could apply the
ideas here to study why awards by companies and governments affect behavior (Frey, 2007),
or to explore the role of approval and disapproval in charity giving, team production, union
formation, voting, or crime, to cite a varied range of problems where non–material sanctions
and rewards are thought to play an important role (Ga¨chter and Fehr 1999).
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Appendix A: Probit Estimations
Here, we present a linear regression model as an alternative argument for the non–parametric
Mann–Whitney U tests reported in the main text in order to analyze how expectations about
approval/disapproval and the feedback provided differ across the group cooperators and the
group of defectors. The dependent variable Yi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1
if subject i cooperates and the value 0 if subject i defects. Depending on the treatment,
we use for each outcome either expectations or hypothetical messages as regressors. To be
more precise, the variable X(si,sj) corresponds to the case when subject i takes action si
and her co–player takes action sj. Then, X(si,sj) takes the value −1 if, in the expectations
treatment, subject i expects that si is disapproved by j or if, in the feedback treatment,
subject i hypothetically disapproves sj. The variable takes the value 0 (+1) in case of a
neutral (positive) assessment. Moreover, if εi is the error term for individual i (distributed
normally and independently with mean zero), the model is completely specified as follows:
Yi = β0 + β1 X(C,C) + β2 X(C,D) + β3 X(D,C) + β4 X(D,D) + εi. (1)
Expectations Feedback
Hypothetical Actual





X(C,D) 0.0939 −0.3577 1.1785
∗∗
(0.2477) (0.3513) (0.5061)





R2 0.1925 0.0632 0.1692
Table 7: Probit Maximum Likelihood estimation on the decision of whether or not to contribute in the
expectations and the feedback treatment. The first of the two actions of an outcome always corresponds to
player who assesses the belief (who sends the message). Standard errors are in parenthesis. Errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 1–percent level. ∗∗ indicates significance at the 5–percent
level. ∗ indicates significance at the 10–percent level.
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Table 7 shows the results of the Probit Maximum Likelihood estimations of Equation 1
with the errors being robust to heteroskedasticity. We also controlled for age and gender, but
neither of the two variables turned out to be significant. Consequently, we eliminated them
from our final specification. Regarding the expectations treatment, it can be observed that
those subjects who expect to be more positively evaluated after outcome (C,C) are also more
likely to cooperate (the sign of β1 is positive and highly significant). Similarly, the subjects
who believe to be more positively evaluated after outcome (D,D) are more likely to defect
(the sign of β4 is negative and significant). Finally, the expectations related to the outcomes
(C,D) and (D,C) do not influence the probability that a subject cooperates. Consequently,
the conclusions drawn from the linear regression model coincide with the Mann–Whitney U
tests reported at the end of Result 1.
We also see that hypothetical message are no indicator of whether a subject cooperates
in the feedback treatment. Since the Mann–Whitney U tests at the end of Result 2 evidence
that cooperators provide a more positive feedback than defectors after outcome (C,C) and
a more negative feedback after outcome (C,D), the two approaches yield clearly different
results. However, we can recover the original insights if we consider actual messages instead
of hypothetical ones; that is, we use as regressors dummy variables that take the value 1 if
subject i actually sent a message to j after outcome (si, sj) and the value 0 otherwise.
The last column of Table 7 shows that subjects who are more prone to send a message after
outcome (C,C) are also more likely to cooperate. Since we have seen before that messages are
in this case mostly positive, there is a positive relationship between approving the co–player’s
action after this outcome and the probability that the subject cooperates. Similarly, there is
also a positive relationship between the likelihood of sending a message after outcome (C,D)
and the probability that the subject cooperates. However, here messages are predominantly
negative and, therefore, we conclude that subjects who disapprove their co–player after out-
come (C,D) are more likely to cooperate. Third, sending a message after outcome (D,D) is
not correlated to the probability to cooperate. Finally, the dummy variable associated with
outcome (D,C) had to be eliminated from the regression since it is co–linear with X(C,D).
Using it as the only regressor does not show any correlation with the probability to cooper-
ate, its parameter estimate is 0.3028 and the standard deviation equals 0.5317. Hence, the
interpretation of this final regression fully coincides with the insights from Mann–Whitney U
tests provided in the main text.
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Appendix B: Instructions of the Feedback Treatment
Welcome
Dear participant, thank you for taking part in this experiment. It will last about 60 minutes.
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn
some money. The entire of money which you earn with your decisions will be paid to you in
cash at the end of the experiment. These instructions are solely for your private information.
We will not speak of Euros during the experiment, but rather of ECU (Experimental Currency
Units). Your whole income will first be calculated in ECU. At the end of the experiment, the
total amount you have earned will be converted to Euro at the following rate:
20 ECU = 1 Euro.
In order to ensure that the experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we would like to ask
you to abide by the following rules. If you do not obey them, we will have to exclude you
from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation.
• Do not communicate with your fellow students. If you have any doubts, raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will clarify them privately.
• do not forget to switch off your mobile phone!
• you may take notes on this instruction sheet if you wish.
• when the experiment finishes, remain seated till we pay you off.
The Experiment
In the experiment you will participate in six different scenarios, and you will be paid for your
decisions in one scenario, randomly chosen at the end of the experiment. More precisely,
the participant playing at the computer number 9 will roll a die and we will pay you the
equivalent in Euros of your ECU earning in the scenario corresponding to the number that
turns up.
In what follows we will explain to you only the first scenario. Once you made your
decision in this first scenario, we will introduce the five remaining scenarios. Note well that
each scenario is independent of the others; that is, your payoff in any scenario does not depend
on decisions taken in other scenarios.
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Scenario 1
In this scenario, you have been randomly and anonymously matched with another participant
and both of you have to choose independently between alternative X and alternative Y.
Depending on your choices, you will get the following ECU payoff:
• if you both choose X, both of you get 180 ECU.
• if you choose X and the other participant chooses Y , you get 80 ECU and the other
participant gets 260 ECU.
• if you choose Y and the other participant chooses X, you get 260 ECU and the other
participant gets 80 ECU.
• if you both choose Y , both of you get 100 ECU.
The matrix below summarizes this.
The other player
X Y
You X (180,180) (80,260)
Y (260,80) (100,100)
Decisions at this scenario will be private; that is, you will never be informed about the
decisions of any other participant in this scenario, and no other participant will know your
decision in this scenario. Apart of choosing between X and Y , in this scenario both of you
have the possibility to send one message to the other participant with your opinion about
her/his choice. Sending a message costs 10 ECU. Since decisions are private, however, you will
not know whether the other participant chose X or Y. For this reason, we will ask you whether
you want to send a message for any possible contingency. More precisely, the procedure will
consist of three steps:
1. You will be asked the following question: “Suppose both of you chose X. Do you want
to send a message paying a cost of 10 ECU?” You can choose either Yes or No.
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2. Independently of your answer to the previous question, you are then asked the following
question: “Suppose you decided to send a message to the other participant in case both
of you chose X. Which of the following three messages do you send?”
• Your choice was good.
• Your choice was neither good nor bad.
• Your choice was bad.
3. The same two previous steps are then repeated for any of the other three possible
combinations of choices: (X,Y ), (Y,X), and (Y, Y ).
Observe again that decisions are always private; that is, none of you will know the choices
of the other participant when going to the next scenario (including messages). The actual
decisions in one scenario will be anonymously revealed to both participants only if, at the end
of the experiment, it turns out that this scenario is randomly chosen for payment. If the die
selects scenario 1, moreover, each participant will receive the message selected by the other
participant at that scenario (step 2) only if the other participant previously chose Yes in step
1. Finally, observe that once the first scenario has finished, you will be matched to a different
participant for the remaining five scenarios.
Control Questions
Please answer the following control questions. Once you have written down all your answers,
please raise your hand so that one of the experimenters can check them.
1. How many different scenarios are there?
2. If you choose X and the other participant chooses X, what will be your payoff?
3. If you choose X and the other participant choosesY , what will be your payoff?
4. Are you always matched with the same participant?
5. How will your final payoff (in Euro) be determined?
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